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ABSTRACT :
This paper investigates factors that brought about the surge in manager unethical behavior within the US
economy. Key structural causes are the  weak  internal control, perverse incentives related to managers’
compensation, conflicts of interest within in the banking and auditing  sectors.  Unethical behavior was
further enhanced by the large economic noise specific to the IT bubble, which emerged in the late nineties
against the background of  increased  deregulation in the  goods and  financial  markets. The US
administration opposed to the proliferation of CEO unethical behavior the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002;
we argue why some of its provisions might be taken one step further.
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RESUME :
L’article étudie les facteurs de nature économique et institutionnelle ayant favorisé l’émergence de
comportements non-éthiques de la part des dirigeants des grandes entreprises américaines durant les
années 1990. L’analyse met l’accent sur l’affaiblissement du contrôle interne, les incitations négatives
engendrées par la rémunération à base de stock-options, les conflits d’intérêts à l’intérieur des banques et
des firmes d’audit comptable. La Loi  Sarbanes Oxley de 2002 est commentée à la lumière de l’étude
économique.
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After ten years of continuous growth, in 2001 the American economy ran into a period of 
deep trouble. GDP growth almost vanished and unemployment rose by almost two percentage 
points in one year. Over the same period, shareholders lost some 7000 billion dollars, in what 
appears to have been the worst stock market decline since the Great Depression. Everybody 
now agrees that a speculative bubble took off in the late nineties, when abnormal growth was 
supported by overconfident expectations about the long-lasting high returns to be generated 
by the new information technologies. This ‘Internet bubble’ burst in March 2001. 
The situation would have not been so critical if the collapse of so many stock prices 
had simply reflected normal readjustment to their fundamental value; but then the US 
economic outlook become really bleak when a wave of corporate scandals surfaced, filling 
newspaper front pages with several cases of outrageous misconduct by chief executive 
officers (CEOs) and/or chief financial officers (CFOs) at leading US companies. William H. 
Donaldson, President of the US Securities and Exchange Commission, describes the problem 
in concise terms: ‘Starting with the unfolding of the Enron story in October 2001, it became 
apparent that the boom years had been accompanied by fraud, other misconduct and serious 
erosion in business principles’ (Donaldson, 2003a). 
It subsequently emerged from the legal investigations into typical cases such as Enron, 
WorldCom, Global Crossing, Tyco, Qwest, Adelphia, etc., that on the eve of the crisis, several 
large companies' CEOs had produced false financial statements with the complicity of corrupt 
auditors, and reaped personal gains from the resulting short-term overvaluation of their 
companies by massively selling their shares just before the firm's collapse. Sometimes, the 
motives for information manipulation were more subtle: either to ‘win time’ for a distressed 
company, or to use overvalued shares to pay for the target company in a takeover. In all cases, 
once revealed, these frauds entailed major costs in terms of reputation, that have ultimately 
been passed on to shareholders and stakeholders. ‘Creative accounting’ and ‘earnings 
manipulation’ were basic ingredients of all the corporate scandals (Carson, 2003; Lev, 2003). 
This variety of manager misconduct can be interpreted as an extreme development of the 
basic conflict of interest between an agent and the principal, as put forward by traditional 
corporate governance literature (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Conflicts of interest may take place whenever an economic agent in charge of a public 
mission derives a private benefit from his job; in many cases, his private interest may conflict 
with the public interest at large. While conflicts of interest between managers and 
shareholders are nothing new, the Internet bubble period proved to be a fertile ground for 
fraud, which is an extreme development of such conflicts (Demski, 2003; Donaldson 2003a; 
2003b; Healy and Palepu, 2003). 
Some broad figures give a better idea of the scale of the problem. To fight corporate 
crime, the United States set up a Corporate Fraud Task Force  in July 2002 within the 
Department of Justice. In the course of one year, this public body charged 354 defendants 
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 with some type of corporate fraud in connection with 169 cases; it has already obtained over 
250 corporate fraud convictions or guilty pleas, including guilty pleas or convictions 
concerning at least 25 former CEOs. From October 1
st through June 30
th 2003, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed 443 enforcement actions, 137 of which involved 
financial fraud on reporting. Eleven companies were suspended from trading, and the assets 
of 30 companies were frozen. The SEC filed almost 50% more financial fraud and reporting 
cases in 2003 than in the previous fiscal year.
1 Of course, while these absolute numbers are 
alarming, they seem less so when weighed against the total 15000 US public companies under 
the SEC's supervision. The most important stylized fact was not the total number of cases, 
which is relatively small, but the unusual surge in wrongdoings. 
The US economy was deeply affected by these corporate scandals. Managerial abuses 
brought about a wave of public distrust and criticism, directed at everything from CEOs' 
individual behavior to shareholder capitalism as a whole. An opinion poll in July 2002 by the 
Harvard Business School and the Pew Research Center showed that only 23% of Americans 
would trust bosses of large companies (yet 75% trusted people who run small businesses).
2 
The loss of trust in the main institutions of capitalism such as publicly traded companies and 
the financial market exacerbated the economic crisis by adversely affecting investment, since 
it increased the cost of raising capital. As a signal of distrust, for more than three years 
following the stock market collapse, the market for initial public offerings has been almost 
inexistent. 
All scholars in social sciences would agree that what can be called ‘ethical behavior’ 
plays an important role in the well-functioning of capitalist economies: given that their 
resource allocation system builds on voluntary exchange between individuals, positive social 
externalities such as trust, loyalty and truth-telling are needed to oil the economic machinery 
(inter alia: Arrow, 1974; McKean, 1975; Becker, 1976; Hirshleifer, 1977; Noreen, 1988; 
Brickley et al., 2002). The wave of corporate scandals that marked the turn of the century, 
mostly in the US but also in Western Europe, were a forceful reminder that in the realm of 
trust and honesty, capitalism comes with its own limits. In his celebrated work, Arrow (1974) 
pointed out that nothing guarantees that contemporary capitalist economies can produce 
sufficient amounts of trust and the other positive social externalities. If the notorious cases of 
managerial abuses are interpreted as a shortage of honesty and loyalty, the recent US 
experience seems to validate his viewpoint. 
The main aim of this paper is to emphasize the economic and institutional factors that 
supported development of dishonest managerial behavior in the US during the Internet bubble 
years (1995-2001). It will be argued that more managers crossed the honesty border because 
incentives to behave well had, for some reason, been attenuated. Somehow, the US had 
deregulated dishonesty. Our policy recommendations build on the reverse argument: to 
prevent managers from following further dishonest strategies, new regulations should make 
those strategies impossible, ineffective or much more expensive. 
Changes in regulation and the economic environment only partially explain 
managerial misconduct. At the corporate level, the company-specific culture probably played 
an important role in encouraging or blocking unethical behavior. As noted by Sims and 
Brinkmann (2003, p.246) who analyzed the Enron case in depth, “the company culture of 
individualism, innovation, and aggressive cleverness left Enron without compassionate, 
responsible leadership”. It may also be surmised that every individual has his own stance on 
ethical behavior; while many managers are concerned about ethics, some are not. Many 
                                                 
1 Press Release by SEC Chairman, William Donaldson, and Deputy Attorney General, Larry Thompson, on July 
22
nd, 2003. See: www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/press/072203whitehousecftfbriefing.htm. 
2 See: ‘Tough at the top. A survey of corporate leadership’, The Economist, October 25
th 2003. 
  1would agree with Watley and May, (2003) and Sims and Brinkmann, (2003) that dishonest 
behaviour is a characteristic of bad management. But while bad regulations can be changed 
without delay, changing a corporate culture or an individual ethical stance can take many 
years. In order to focus on elements that are under the control of policymakers, this chapter 
will leave the major cultural or individual dimensions out of the picture.
3
The paper is organized as follows. The next section analyses changes in the US 
economic and financial structure that paved the way for dishonest in depth managerial 
behavior during the Internet bubble. Section 3 comments on the US policy response to this 
phenomenon and draws some recommendations for further reform. The final section presents 
the conclusion. 
 
2. Key factors explaining the surge in dishonest managerial 
behavior 
 
2.1 A broad picture of the US economic environment 
 
The US economy features both a mature financial market and a powerful sector of publicly 
traded companies. These two major institutions are not independent: publicly traded 
companies need an efficient capital market for financing, and financing instruments issued by 
publicly traded companies (corporate bonds and shares) are essential ‘commodities’ in the 
financial market. The quality of the financial instruments traded on the market, and the quality 
of the transactions themselves depends on the existing corporate governance structures. Last 
but not least, the information disclosure rules and the financial information system have an 
impact on the allocative efficiency of the financial market. 
Since the focus here is on conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders, the 
relevant field of analysis is the publicly traded companies sector. Most of them are large 
companies. While large companies contribute only about half of the total US economy in 
terms of GDP, their influence on the rest of the economy cannot be underestimated given their 
coverage of the essential sectors (water and energy distribution, transportation, 
telecommunications, electronics and engineering, etc), their leading role in innovation, and 
their position as client for many small companies. According to the US Census Bureau, in 
2000, the 17000 companies with 500 employees and more (0.3% of the total number of 
companies) accounted for about 55% of the annual payroll and 50% of total employment. 
Large companies finance themselves by reinvesting profits, through bank loans and issuing 
shares and bonds. A distinctive feature of the US economic system is the prevalence of this 
third financing channel. More precisely, contrary to the Continental European model, where 
many large companies are still private (non-listed) and where bank loans represent the main 
external source of funding, in the Anglo-Saxon model, the capital market (where companies 
sell bonds and shares) provides the bulk of new business finance resources. This leads to 
major differences between the incentive systems at work in the two zones, and calls for a 
specific form of regulation. 
On the savings side, in the nineties, one American out of two held shares, either 
directly or through various types of investment funds. The development of a dispersed 
shareholder base was backed by several structural changes. The population aging problem 
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these important topics. 
  2increased the amount of savings and pension funds emerged as major players in the capital 
market. Mutual funds, those important vehicles for ‘popular’ capitalism, made share 
ownership accessible to many small investors. 
The emergence of new financial instruments such as derivative products brought 
further momentum to the development of the capital market. New markets have emerged, 
now connected to economic risks that a few years ago were beyond the realm of the financial 
sphere, for instance natural catastrophes or climate change. The creation of hedge funds, those 
lightly regulated investment vehicles, allows (wealthy) private investors to participate in 
financial transactions reserved in the past for expert institutional traders (leverage 
investments, short-selling of assets and so on). 
This widening and deepening of the financial market occurred against a background of 
additional deregulation in the goods markets: the state was pulling out of many traditional 
sectors, for instance transportation, energy and telecommunications. Even in sectors 
traditionally controlled by the state (e.g. the defense industry), the government increasingly 
resorted to managed competition. 
Technical progress, mainly in the information technologies, is changing the way 
people communicate, organize business and trade. In the goods markets, price information 
can easily reach buyers in this Internet era; since search costs are lowered, spatial 
differentiation attenuates and local market power declines: as a result, many goods markets 
are tending to move closer to a situation of perfect competition, to the benefit of consumers. 
In the financial sphere, trade orders travel at the speed of light, and many financial markets 
quote prices in real time. Yet all practitioners will agree that information in financial markets 
is far from perfect; this happens because the traded ‘commodity’ is a claim on future 
resources. But future resources can only be contingent on the state of affairs at the time the 
claim is due, making them random variables. When trading future claims, people have to form 
expectations about their value, but these expectations involve a high degree of subjectivity in 
the choice of the relevant probabilities. In this specific context, many economists have 
pointed out that rumors, herding behavior, inside trading and expectation bubbles may all 
explain why at some given time the transaction price of an asset can drift away from its 
fundamental value.
4
In particular, privileged traders have the ability to influence prices, either because they 
are big (i.e. they trade large volumes) and/or because they have a high reputation. In recent 
years, managers have discovered that the way they communicate about their company's 
performances also has considerable influence on share prices. Since they have significant 
control over the outgoing information flow, they may be tempted to use their ‘market power’ 
in the corporate information market in order to achieve self-interested objectives (Besancenot 
and Vranceanu, 2004). 
Against this background of deregulation in the financial and goods markets, a mix of 
institutional and economic factors joined forces to set off a proliferation of dishonest 
managerial behavior during the late nineties. The first factor can be termed cyclical, as it is 
closely connected to the economic boom; it provided the ground layer for the others factors to 
become active. The other factors may be called structural, to emphasize their relative 
independence of the macroeconomic outlook. 
 
2.2. The cyclical factor 
 
                                                 
4 See Stiglitz and Greenwald (1991) for an analysis of the economic functions of contemporary financial 
institutions with special emphasis on the imperfect information issue.  
  3Economic history shows that many ‘affairs’ have come to light at the end of every period of 
exuberant growth driven by overoptimistic expectations, to mention only the railroads or the 
electricity episodes (Malkiel, 1973; Kindelberger, 1978). In a ‘bubblish’ environment, the gap 
between the market value and the fundamental value of selected commodities and financial 
assets widens sharply, so that prices no longer convey relevant information. Borrowing the 
physicist's vocabulary, we say that the ‘noise’ of the system increases. In such an 
environment, decision-makers have more difficulties in extracting the relevant signals. 
Periods where economic agents believe that large profits can be obtained in a short period of 
time, and behave accordingly, are supportive for unethical managerial behavior for at least 
three reasons. 
Firstly, in a ‘bubblish’ environment shareholders must process a large amount of 
information; in particular, they may be blinded by the ongoing rise in the share price 
(becoming victims of a kind of price illusion). This makes it easier for dishonest managers to 
hide their actions. As the probability of being caught decreases, the expected cost of fraud 
declines and more managers may be tempted to increase their own wealth by fraudulent 
means. 
Secondly, ‘good conduct’ is a relative concept: in general, people believe they are 
behaving well when they are doing what their peers do. To take a basic example, if in a given 
country all drivers drive slowly, within the legal speed limit, individuals internalize this norm 
and derive some satisfaction from driving like everybody else, i.e. slowly. If everybody drives 
fast, the individual will be satisfied if driving fast too. Both situations are stable Nash 
equilibria, but the second is socially dominated, since it comes with an increased number of 
lethal road accidents. In the business world, if all managers were concerned with sustainable 
corporate development, a “ruthless” outlier would never get enough support for his action; 
conversely, in a world where all managers are obsessed with heuristically-given, excessive 
targets (like a yearly 15% profit rate), anyone who speaks seriously about environmental 
protection or corporate social responsibility will only be marginalized. 
Thirdly, and this relates to the above point, the task of the external authorities in 
charge of policing deviant behavior is much more difficult in a ‘noisy’ environment. These 
public bodies use comparisons (benchmarking) as their main method of controlling 
managerial performances and actions. In a favorable equilibrium, if someone deviates, the 
authorities can easily detect and correct the deviation. In the unfavorable equilibrium where 
all drivers drive fast, how can the police helicopter observe all those exceeding the speed 
limit? Detection technology exists, but can be expensive. 
The risk with economic bubbles such as the Internet bubble is that they replace social 
norms assigning a significant role to ‘hard work’ and responsibility with norms where easy 
short-term gains seem both possible and consistent with the common good. In general, people 
come to realize the absurdity of such a situation only after the bubble has burst. 
Unfortunately, once a social norm has collapsed, the costs of reinstating it can be quite 
considerable. 
We turn now our attention to those structural factors that contributed to the increase in 
unethical managerial behavior. Emphasis is set on information manipulation, whither internal 
control, perverse incentives related to option-based compensation, and corruption of auditors 
and financial analysts. 
2.3. Information manipulation and “creative accounting” 
 
Most of the CEOs’ frauds during the Internet bubble period consisted of information 
manipulation causing abnormal stock prices. Many managers carried out such actions with 
total disregard for shareholders and/or stakeholders' goals, pursuing a short-term objective of 
  4large personal gain, for instance by selling shares just before the company collapsed. 
Sometimes motives were subtler than straightforward personal gain. Some financial 
misstatements were intended to keep share prices up during a take-over (generally by way of 
exchange of shares). While incumbent shareholders (and the CEO) may have gained from 
such action, the target company's shareholders were robbed. In one notorious example from 
early 1997, the management team of Boeing, the US airplane maker, deliberately omitted to 
report abnormal costs due to late delivery and other production difficulties, in order to shore 
up the share price before the take-over of a rival, McDonnell-Douglas; they then reported 
losses of 2.6 billion dollars three months after the share exchange.
5 In other cases, fraudulent 
behavior by the CEO aimed at ‘winning time’ for a distressed company facing difficulties in 
its relations with clients and suppliers. Even though personal gain was not necessarily the 
main goal of this manipulation, clearly such unethical behavior can only penalize 
shareholders and stakeholders in the long run, since nobody would wish to deal with a 
company whose management has a reputation as liars. 
How can managers push up share prices? Managers are better informed about the 
company status than anyone else, be they employees, investment bankers or auditing firms. 
Sometimes, top executives lie by describing the company's outlook in excessively rosy terms; 
at other times, all they have to do to keep prices up is to hide a relevant piece of information. 
Of all the various techniques for manipulating investors’ expectations, one was particularly 
extensively used during the last crisis. Managers understood that the easiest way to keep the 
company share price up is to report high earnings. As shown by theoretical and empirical 
analyses, for various reasons, investors tend to highly rate companies reporting high earnings, 
and vice-versa.
6 Based on a survey of 31 countries, Leutz, Nanda and Wysoki (2003) argued 
that earnings manipulation is positively correlated with managers’ benefits. 
How can managers manipulate earnings? Under the US accounting standards ⎯ 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, or GAAP ⎯ companies use accrual accounting, 
that is: “attempts to record financial effects on an entity of transactions … in the periods in 
which those transactions … occur rather than only in the period when the cash is received or 
paid by the entity” (FASB 1985, SFAC 6, para. 139). As emphasized by Xie et. al. (2003), the 
principle of accrual accounting gives managers great discretion in reporting earnings over a 
given period. The scope for ‘creative accounting’, that is the capacity of dishonest managers 
to push the existing accounting standard to its limit, increased with the emergence of new 
financial instruments: derivatives, offshore markets, new debt instruments, and so on. 
During the boom period, many companies systematically understated liabilities and/or 
inflated assets. For instance, WorldCom management deliberately reported ordinary expenses 
of seven billion dollars as an investment. Enron set up “special vehicles” – read outside units 
working as affiliates in all respects except in their name – and sold them gas against a promise 
to buy it back one year later; it then reported the revenues but not the liabilities. Quest 
Communications improperly counted more than one billion dollars as revenues in the 1999-
2001 period; in particular, the company booked the revenues on fiber optic sales before 
delivering the product to customers. Computer Associates also booked more than two billion 
dollars in revenues through accounting sleight-of-hand that involved backdating of contracts. 
Some companies had recourse to “swap” trades that both parties recorded as revenue (e.g. 
Dynegy, Quest, Global Crossing). Many other manipulations took the form of mis-estimating 
                                                 
5 In November 2003, Boeing fired its CFO, Mike Sears, for communicating with a US Air Force acquisition 
official about her future employment with the company while she was in charge of purchases of tanker aircraft 
for the Pentagon and was processing Boeing and Airbus’ offers. The CEO, Phil Condit, had to resign soon 
afterwards. See Business Week, Mai 20, 2002; The Economist, November 29




6 As pointed out by Zhang (2000), the relationship between share value and earnings may not be linear. 
  5reserves and provisions (see Lev, 2003; Stiglitz, 2003; Healy and Palepu, 2003; Sims and 
Brinkmann, 2003). 
Boards of directors clearly failed in their mission of monitoring the financial 
statements provided by the CEOs and CFOs. While no empirical relationship between 
earnings manipulation and the overall structure of boards has been put forward, Xie et al. 
(2003) point to the essential monitoring rule played by the audit committee. In an empirical 
study covering 110 US companies over three years, they show that earnings manipulation 
(what they call “earnings management”) is less likely to occur in companies whose audit 
committees include more independent outside directors, and directors with corporate 
experience. 
When a manager succeeds in manipulating investors’ expectations by issuing a false 
signal and thus pushes up the share price for a limited period, the result is not a zero sum 
game where some shareholders lose (those who keep their shares) and some win (those who 
sell the shares before the truth comes out). One of the capital market's main roles is to provide 
information about the economic position of a given company; evolutions in its share price 
provide early signals for investors and boards, which must implement corrections in the 
company’s strategy and management. If these corrections are timely, adjustments are smooth; 
otherwise, adjustments happen in jumps, which are always costly (especially if the firm is 
filling for bankruptcy). 
 
 
2.4. Whither internal control 
 
In general, publicly traded companies are governed by a board of directors; in the US this is a 
legal requirement for incorporation. The board must oversee top management's actions on 
behalf of the shareholders. According to the Conference Board's annual survey, boards have 
on average nine members, meet about six times per year and each member receives basic 
compensation within the range of 10000 to 70000 dollars (Demski, 2003). Some of the 
members come from within the company, while others are outsiders. 
The conflict of interest between directors and the CEO is nothing new: while directors 
aim at building and maintaining a reputation as honest experts, CEOs have incentives to 
“capture” them, so as to protect their positions and extract greater benefits (Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2003). The situation is clearly described by William H. Donaldson, the SEC 
Chairman (since December 2002): 
 
Over the past decade or more, at too many companies, the chief executive position 
has steadily increased in power and influence. In some cases the CEO had 
become more of a monarch than a manager. Many boards have become gradually 
more deferential to the opinions, judgements and decisions of the CEO and senior 
management team. This deference has been an obstacle to directors’ ability to 
satisfy the responsibility that the owners – the shareholders – have delegated and 
entrusted to them. (Donaldson, 2003b, pp. 17) 
 
That managers are taking control over boards is obvious to anyone who observes 
CEOs’ compensation over a long period. A first spectacular jump occurred in the period 
1980-1985; over those few years, the CEO compensation per dollar of profit doubled. In the 
nineties, this tendency was even more pronounced. The average real compensation for the 500 
S&P CEOs leapt from 3.5 million dollars in 1992 to 14.7 million in 2000. The fall in average 
incomes was fairly limited during the crisis, since it was still as high as 9.4 million dollars in 
  62002.
7 Bebchuck et al. (2002) were among the first to suggest that in the Internet years, 
entrenched CEOs set out to "capture" boards of directors and grant themselves large pay 
increases at the expense of shareholders. Arthur Levitt, a former and influential President of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission, wrote that ‘unseemly excessive compensation and 
separation packages are a consequence of boards falling victim to a seduction by the CEO’ 
(Levitt, 2004, pp. A7). Perel (2003, p. 384) points out that many directors are ‘ill-qualified to 
proffer opinions on executive compensation’; hence, many boards will decide on top 
executive compensation based on the advice of external consultants, most often hired by … 
the same top executives. In an empirical analysis, Core at al. (1999) found that companies 
with weaker governance tend to pay their CEOs more.
8
In a notorious example of lack of transparency and weak board control, the former 
NYSE chairman Richard Grasso obtained from the board, whose members were in general 
appointed by him, secret compensation of 48 million dollars on top of his declared 140 
million dollars. When in September 2003 the authorities uncovered this hidden amount, the 
chairman was forced to resign and the board began a restructuring process.
9
 
2.5. The problem with stock-option based compensation 
 
As emphasized by Carson (2003, pp. 392), ‘terms of employment and compensation schemes 
can create incentives for unethical conduct’ and ‘rules, decision procedures and schemes for 
reward and compensation all need to be scrutinized for the incentive they create’. Let us 
follow his advice and take a closer look at the US executive compensation system. 
In 1994, the US enacted Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code, which capped 
corporate tax deductibility of compensations awarded to the five highest-paid executives at 
one million dollars per executive, unless the additional income qualified as performance-
based pay. Unsurprisingly, after this regulatory change was implemented, many large 
companies set their managers' salary right at the upper limit, and then awarded them more in 
performance-related compensation. There are many ways to relate pay to performance, the 
traditional methods being bonuses based on profits or other quantitative targets (market share, 
customer satisfaction, innovation, etc.), and shares that can be sold at a later time. In practice, 
stock options became the preferred form of incentive pay. 
In general, a call option gives the holder the right to buy a share prior to an ‘expiration 
time’ at an ‘exercise price’ fixed at the time the option is issued.
10 In most compensation 
schemes, the exercise price is equal to the market price at the issue date, and managers may 
convert a quarter of the total stock option grant at the end of every year over a five-year 
period. In many cases, when the manager decides to exercise his options, the company will 
issue new shares. This means the value of each individual share is diluted, since the 
company's market value is distributed between a higher number of shares. 
                                                 
7 See Hall and Murphy (2003). Similar data can be found in: ‘Tough at the top. A survey of corporate 
leadership’, The Economist, October 25
th, 2003 
8 A caveat is put forward by Hermalin and Weisbach (2003): highly successful CEOs may command both high 
compensation and low monitoring by the board. Murphy and Zabojnik (2004) suggest that, to some extent, the 
increase in wages may be explained by increased competition between firms to attract good managers. 
9 None of the new board members will belong to institutions regulated by the NYSE, as was the case with the 
former board. See: “John Reeds modest proposal”, The Economist, November 22
nd, 2003. See also the next 
chapter. 
10 Holders of ‘American options’ may exercise the option at any time prior to expiration, whereas ‘European 
options’ can be exercised only at the pre-determined expiration time. 
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know what the exact price of the share will be at the time of exercise, but he has an idea of the 
statistical distribution of the future price. He knows that if the share price goes up, he will 
benefit from the spread between the exercise price and the market price, while in the worst of 
cases, if the share price goes down, he will lose nothing. As a consequence, his expectations 
about the future gain can only be positive. For the company on the other hand, any 
compensation scheme including the value of a stock-option grant is a cost with manager labor 
input that affects corporate profit. 
From a US tax standpoint, the spread between the market and exercise prices is 
considered as an expense and can be deducted from the company’s taxable earnings. But 
strange as it may seem, US accounting rules in force in the late nineties did not require that 
stock option grants to managers and employees should be recorded as an expense; if stock-
option pay expenses had been recorded as such, US companies' earnings per share would have 
been 14% lower than reported in the nineties (Botosan and Plumlee, 2001). The US 
accounting rules merely required the estimated market value (or “fair” value) of the stock-
option grant to be reported in a footnote to the annual financial statement! So, paradoxical 
though it may be, the massive recourse to stock option grants enabled companies to pay lower 
corporate taxes, while simultaneously declaring higher accounting earnings. 
The main thrust of the argument against expensing stock option grants emphasizes that 
the traditional Black and Scholes (1973) option pricing model, which is extensively utilized 
for valuing publicly traded options, cannot apply to option-based compensation, since it takes 
no account of vesting periods (the option cannot be exercised immediately), non-
transferability, the possibility of early exercise, shifts in earnings distribution that the option 
grant itself may entail, variable stock volatility, and so on. This argument remains 
unconvincing: theoretical research in the field is well-developed and more powerful models, 
able to take these specificities into account, can and have been designed (e.g. Huddart, 1994; 
Hemmer et al., 1994; Cuny and Jorion, 1995). The US regulatory board in charge of 
accounting standard-setting, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), has long 
acknowledged that satisfactory methods exist; FASB Statement No.123 (December 1995) 
recommended that companies should utilize fair value methods for assessing the cost of stock-
based compensation. The general idea was that although no perfect evaluation method was 
available, a rough estimate was better than no estimate at all. But companies did not follow 
this sensible advice. 
The only group of people that could benefit from this obvious shortage of transparency 
was the executives (Carson, 2003; Hall and Murphy, 2003; Levitt, 2004; Stiglitz, 2003). As 
pointed out by Guay et al. (2003, pp. 408) the lack of transparency specific to un-expensed 
options helped top managers ‘to justify awarding themselves excessively lucrative pay 
packages’. It does appear to be easier to convince boards to grant a manager a million-dollar 
pay increase in the form of an option plan (since no expense is recorded, and annual earnings 
are not affected) than in a million-dollar cash bonus. 
For all these reasons, the volume of option-based revenues kept on increasing. In the 
nineties, nearly 80% of the rise in CEO pay took the form of stock options; given this 
dynamic, in the bubble years the share of option-based compensation represented as much as 
60% to 70% of CEOs’ total compensation (Perel, 2003). Proponents claim that they provide 
an efficient mechanism for aligning manager and shareholder interests, and retaining good 
managers and staff in young companies that face cash shortages. Do massive stock option 
grants entail any risks? The answer to that question must bring both the compensation 
structure and the manager's decision horizon into the picture. 
Let us consider the case of the manager of a company whose fundamentals are weak, 
and whose market value is being driven upwards by the bubble. Of course, the CEO knows 
  8that at some time in the future the game will be up. If most of its compensation consists of 
pending shares or options to become exercisable in the near future, the rational strategy for 
the manager will be to push up the share price as high as possible, cash the options, and watch 
the company collapse. This may have been the case at Enron, whose "Old Economy" 
background (gas distribution) was shrinking, while the bulk of its earnings came from its 
risky dotcom branch, trading gas end energy. Kenneth Lay, the Enron CEO, cashed 120 
million dollars in options a few weeks before the company went bankrupt, while employees 
were prevented from selling Enron shares (mostly components of their retirement plans). In 
the same vein, Gary Winnick, the CEO of Global Crossing, also made more than 130 million 
dollars by selling shares during the few weeks immediately before the company’s bankruptcy. 
Studying a poll of 600 companies listed with the SEC, Rosner (2003) shows that fragile firms 
with no obvious signs of distress prior to bankruptcy were more likely to succeed in reporting 
overstated earnings in their financial statements than firms considered as fragile ex ante. 
This logic may also explain why the majority of “Old Economy” firms were not 
affected by this type of opportunistic behavior. If the manager knows that his company is 
robust, and that once the bubble bursts its value will realign with fundamentals, will he 
behave in the same way? Probably not. If he has to choose between a large one-off gain 
followed by job termination and the discounted value of future benefits on the job, the 
incentives to cheat are less powerful. 
 
2.6. Corrupt auditors and financial analysts 
 
Accounting information would not have been so easy to manipulate without the complicity of 
corrupt  auditors. Accounting firms were also greedy. They all carried out auditing and 
consulting activities, and most of them provided both services to the same client. In 
November 2000, alerted by the increasing signals that conflicts of interest were probably 
under way, the SEC made every endeavor to pass a rule that would have prohibited 
accounting firms from providing consulting services to their audit clients; but in the face of 
strong opposition from both audit firms and their clients, the SEC had to scale back its 
proposal (Palmrose and Saul, 2001). This failed regulation is an indicator of the global mood 
in the ‘bubblish’ US environment at the time, where common sense was completely overtaken 
by almost generalized opportunistic behavior. After the crises, the SEC's worst fears were 
validated. 
The case of Andersen, one of what were five audit firms with a global network, is 
probably the most significant example of dishonest accounting firms. The name of this now 
defunct company was linked with almost all the notorious corporate scandals. In June 2002, 
after five weeks of evidence and ten days of deliberation, a jury found Andersen guilty of 
obstructing the course of justice in the Enron case. David Duncan, the leading Andersen 
partner in charge of auditing Enron, pleaded guilty to the charge of shredding thousands of 
documents. How could Andersen have been ‘independent in fact and appearance’ as required 
by the law, when more than half of its billion-dollar-a-week bills to Enron concerned non-
audit services? (Demski, 2003). 
Many other audit firms, including the other four major firms, allowed varying degrees 
of significant scope for abusive interpretation of the accounting rules, or even outright fraud. 
For instance, on September 25
th, 2003, Thomas Trauger, a former auditor with Ernst and 
Young, was arrested for his alleged participation in the destruction of audit working 
documents during the audit of NextCard.  Then, memorably, in early 2002 Deloitte&Touche 
reviewed the auditing practices of Andersen and concluded that the firm complied with the 
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time. 
Beside boards and accounting firms, the financial status of public companies comes 
under close scrutiny from security analysts  at banks, investment funds and rating agencies 
such as Moody’s,  Standard & Poor’s or Fitch. Company management put tremendous 
pressure on these people too. Traditionally, analysts who advised their clients to buy the 
shares of a given company used to benefit from all the firm’s favors, while those who advised 
to “sell” were persecuted quite openly (for instance, being prevented from attending general 
shareholders' meetings, among other tactics). Rating agencies only downgraded Enron’s 
bonds on November 28
th, 2001, when the company was nearly bankrupt. 
Companies obtained new means of putting the pressure on bank security analysts in 
1999, when the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act  on Brokers Rules put an end to the Glass-Steagall 
Act of 1933. This had been introduced in the aftermath of the Great Depression, when 11000 
of the US' 40000 banks went out of business, causing major disruption to the financial system 
and huge social pain for those who had seen their lifetime savings vanish. It set out a clear 
separation of financial intermediaries' investment activities and commercial activities. The 
generally accepted rationale for this law was well expressed in the brief filed by the First 
National City Bank (1970) in support of the Comptroller of the Currency: 
 
…three well-defined evils were found to flow from the combination of investment 
and commercial banking: (i) banks were investing their own assets in securities 
with consequent risk to commercial and savings deposits; (ii) unsound loans were 
made in order to shore up the price of securities or the financial position of 
companies in which a bank had invested its own assets; (iii) a commercial bank's 
financial interest in the ownership, price, or distribution of securities inevitably 
tempted bank officials to press their banking customers into investing in securities 
which the bank itself was under pressure to sell because of its own pecuniary 
stake in the transaction. (FNCB, 1970, pp. 40-42)
11
 
All these evils came back to haunt the economy of the late nineties, once the Glass-
Steagall Act was on the verge of being abrogated. Banks rushed to underwrite bonds issued by 
star companies, while also having to advise the public whether or not to buy shares in these 
firms. The conflict of interest was more than obvious. In a typical example, WorldCom issued 
five billion bonds with Citibank as the legal underwriter. The same bank also granted Bernie 
Ebbers, WorldCom's CEO, a 400 million-dollar loan with WorldCom shares as collateral. Let 
us assume that the bank got hold of some information about the company's true financial 
position. Would it disclose it? Jack B. Grumman, financial analyst at Salmon Smith Barney, a 
Citibank partner, maintained his recommendation to buy WorldCom shares and even issued a 
forecast of a 100% increase in the share price, only three months before the company's 
bankruptcy (Stiglitz, 2003). In 2002, investigations by New York Attorney General Eliot 
Spitzer showed that Merrill Lynch analysts were doctoring their reports to win business for 
their banks' investment arms.
12
 
To sum up, many factors contributed to the surge in dishonest managerial behavior 
during the Internet bubble years. At that time, increased ‘noise’ in the economy lowered the 
probability of the existing supervision system detecting deviant action. There are also many 
signs suggesting that the detection system itself, where boards of directors play the central 
                                                 
11 See: www.cftech.com/BrainBank/specialreports/GlassSteagall.html. 
12 See: ‘Wall Street’s Top Cop’, Time, December 22
nd, 2002. 
  10role, was gradually ‘captured’ by the managers. CEOs succeeded in granting themselves ever 
increasing compensation packages, mostly in the form of stock options. This reinforced 
incentives for short-term planning, which proved to be an extremely dangerous practice in the 
context of the most fragile companies. Finally, by blocking the early signals that a slide in 
share prices might have conveyed, managers prevented timely error correction (any 
adjustment would probably have involved the loss of their jobs) and made bankruptcy 
inevitable. 
 
3. New activism and the way ahead 
 
To restore trust after the crisis, the US administration threw itself energetically into 
developing business regulations, with the aim of strengthening corporate surveillance, 
fighting fraudulent accounting practices and enhancing the effectiveness of the legal system in 
this field. 
On July 9
th, 2002, a Corporate Fraud Task Force including US Attorneys, the FBI and 
the SEC was set up to oversee the investigation and prosecution of financial fraud, accounting 
fraud and other corporate criminal activity, and to provide enhanced inter-agency 
coordination of regulatory and criminal investigations. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act , signed in 
July 2002, was designed to tighten up supervision of the practices of the accounting 
profession, strengthen auditor independence rules, increase the accountability of executive 
officers and board directors, enhance the timeliness and quality of financial reports of public 
companies, and protect employees’ retirement plans from insider trading.
13 Both the SEC and 
the new law require the CEOs and CFOs of large public companies to personally certify the 
accuracy and fairness of their companies’ public filings. 
The increased effectiveness of the US anti-fraud agencies helped them address more 
complex and insidious cases than the more trivial early frauds; notorious examples are the 
mutual funds scandal, where over fifteen large US mutual funds came under scrutiny for 
illegal practices, and the foreign exchange rate fraud. The list of top executives indicted for 
fraud grew longer every day (see the Corporate Task Fraud website).
14 Some of them have 
already been convicted and sentenced to jail terms and fines. Changes in the federal 
sentencing guidelines in 2001 and 2003 significantly raised the penalties for fraud; 
economically damaging frauds are now on the same level as armed robberies, and prison 
sentences of over 20 years are not unusual.
15
All in all, the legal system has significantly stepped up both its effectiveness and 
toughness in dealing with corporate crime. But when it comes to dealing with the economic 
factors that contributed to the proliferation of dishonest manager behaviour in the Internet 
bubble years, the US Administration has taken a comparatively soft stance on post-bubble 
reform. 
The valuation of stock-based compensation became one of the most controversial 
issues in recent accounting history (Guay et al. 2003). Although many US companies 
unilaterally decided after the 2001 troubles to adopt fair value methods of expensing stock-
option pay, the FASB did not make it mandatory. In December 2002, the FASB issued 
Statement No. 148, Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation – Transition and Disclosure, 
as an amendment to Statement No. 123 of December 1995. The document made only minor 
changes to existing regulations, mainly improving the quality of information available in the 
                                                 
13 The text of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is available at www.pcaobus.org/rules/Sarbanes_Oxley_Act_of_2002.pdf. 
14 See www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/. 
15 ‘Bosses behind bars’, The Economist, June 12
th, 2004. 
  11footnote to the yearly financial statements referred to earlier, and asking that this information 
should also be disclosed in the quarterly statements. But the FASB is pushing the reform 
further, and the chances of seeing it implemented improved in 2004; the Exposure Draft 
Share-Based Payment (March 31
st, 2004) advocates the mandatory expensing of stock-option 
grants; companies may choose one of several accepted evaluation methods. It remains to be 
seen whether the industrial lobby from the west coast high-tech companies will manage to 
block this reform too.
16
During the Internet bubble years, many boards of directors were actually “captured” 
by the CEO and failed in their chief mission of monitoring the manager. After 2001, many 
companies spontaneously undertook a process of reviewing and ‘cleaning up’ their 
governance systems. While everybody agrees that directors should not fall under the 
manager’s influence, the question of how independence can be enforced is still open to 
debate. It is generally assumed that outsiders are more impervious than insiders to managers’ 
charms. This is not necessarily true; for instance, if the manager has a say in recruiting a new 
board member, that board member may want to support the manager in troubled times (the 
‘gift exchange’ principle, where one good turn deserves another). This uncertainty would 
explain why no new regulation addressed this important issue. In a notable exception, Section 
301 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act marks a singular step in the right direction: it stipulates that all 
boards of directors' audit committees should be made up of independent members of the 
board. The audit committee is important since it supervises the relationship between the 
company and the auditing firm. 
As required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, a Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board was set up in January 2003, to ‘oversee the audit of public companies subject to the 
securities law…’ (Section 101). This Board, an independent non-profit organisation financed 
by compulsory contributions from all listed companies and security issuers, has wide-ranging 
inspection and rule-making authority over all auditing firms.
17 In an economic context where 
more than half of the American people hold shares and trade in shares is highly decentralized, 
providing accurate information about the financial position of listed companies should be seen 
as a public good. This information is needed by a myriad of shareholders; they should be 
considered the legitimate clients of the accounting firms. So far such a market for information 
– with direct trade in information between shareholders and accounting firms – has not 
emerged spontaneously. Mancur Olson’s (1971) theory on collective action perhaps provides 
an answer to this coordination failure: the market cannot emerge, since no single small 
consumer would pay for the production of information, and all consumers have an incentive 
to free-ride on the collective production of information. One possible solution would be to let 
the government organize the production of high quality financial information. If, on behalf of 
shareholders, a government agency became the main client of auditing firms, it could then set 
up some form of managed competition between auditors (as has happened in the US defence 
sector). 
Section 201 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act prohibits auditing firms from providing a wide 
range of consulting services to their clients for at least 180 days after the end of the audit 
process. However, that implies that only six months after an audit, any auditor could be hired 
on a consulting contract by the same client. It will be interesting to see how frequently such 
dubious situations emerge in the future. Conflicts of interest can be ruled out only if the law 
imposes strict separation of audit and consulting firms. To comply with the law, in 2003, the 
                                                 
16 See: FASB Project Update Equity-Based Compensation, www.fasb.org/project/equity-based_comp.shtml, and 
US warned over options reform, Financial Times, July 1
st, 2004. In Europe, companies using the International 
Accounting Standards will have to start expensing stock options from January 2005. 
17 See Testimony before the United States Senate, by William J. McDonough, Chairman of the PCAOB at: 
www.pcaobus.org/transcripts/McDonough_11-20-03.asp. 
  12"big four" auditing firms split from their legal advisory arms and terminated their partnerships 
with major law firms. 
The 2001 crisis differed from the Great Depression with respect to the relatively good 
financial position of the banking sector (the amount of bad loans was moderate). With some 
cynicism, it can be surmised that the US were lucky that the bubble burst no later than 2001, 
only two years after the abrogation of the Glass-Steagall Act. By allowing banks to carry out 
brokerage activities, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 left the door wide open for 
conflicts of interest between same-bank commercial and investment activities, and an 
increasing number of abuses have been recorded since. By strengthening the independence of 
research analysts relative to officials involved in investment activities, the Section 501 of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act makes a timid step in the right direction. In the same vein, on July 29, 
2003 the Securities and Exchange Commission approved rules proposed by the New York 
Stock Exchange to specify the period over which a member firm engaged in a public offering 
of a security or as an underwriter or a dealer cannot publish research on this security. The 
rules also require analysts and members to disclose any conflicts of interest; in particular, they 
must provide information on whether in the past they had received any compensation from the 
issuer that is the subject of the research report.
18
However, the current system of regulations is so complex it is hardly surprising that 
‘innovative’ bankers find ways to circumvent it. The only sensible policy choice would be to 
reinstate a modern version of the Glass-Steagall Act imposing a clear separation of 
commercial and investment activities. Some may criticize this recommendation, pointing to 
the experience of Germany, where such conflicts of interest do not occur systematically and 
despite the lack of separation between investment and commercial/savings activities; but it 
must be borne in mind that the capital market is much less developed in Germany than in the 
United States. Relying more on banks to finance the corporate sector may provide a workable 




The US corporate scandals of the early 2000s have provided a forceful reminder of a basic 
principle of economic analysis: when weak internal corporate control allows managers to set 
up policies that diverge significantly from shareholders’ interests, corrections are ultimately 
brought about by external forces in the financial and goods markets. While these market-
driven adjustments are necessary, they may be extremely brutal and may come with heavy 
social costs: firms go bust, growth is hampered and millions of employees may lose their jobs.  
Most abuses were carried out by managers in companies with weak fundamentals, and 
most of them were related one way or another to speculation on the Internet and 
telecommunications markets. Managerial misconduct consisted essentially of manipulating 
investors’ expectations, through artificially inflated earnings by means of false financial 
statements or other forms of fraudulent accounting. They successfully avoided early detection 
with the complicity of corrupt accounting firms and excessively tolerant financial analysts, 
and by taking advantage of the wave of naïve public faith in the New Economy saga. As 
shown by the US experience, the economic cost of reneging on ethical principles can be 
extremely high. Managers come to focus on short-term performances, and recourse to 
                                                 
18 In 2003, ten major US security firms agreed to pay 1.4 billion dollars to settle regulators’ accusation that their 
analysts wrote too favorable reports in order to win underwriting assignments (Wall Street Journal, November 
23, 2004). 
  13unethical actions – even those not motivated by hopes of personal gain – can only damage a 
firm’s reputation and precipitate corporate collapse. 
The best policymakers can do to avoid future corporate scandals is to make dishonest 
behaviour a very expensive or ineffective strategy for managers. Of course, this presupposes 
the existence of an efficient legal system able to detect and sanction abuses. This system 
cannot work properly without clear economic rules. Those rules cannot be minimalist; it 
would be a mistake to believe that in the absence of external constraints, the resulting 
equilibrium will necessarily be optimal. The recent corporate scandals in the US provide 
support for Arrow’s (1974) claim that without proper regulation, the capitalist economy 
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